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Abstract:  
The health care system in the Netherlands is undergoing restructuring. The once 
strongly regulated healthcare system with a limited number of care providers is 
transforming into a marketplace with a wide variety of care providers. We expect 
that this restructuring will also create new opportunities for electronic business in 
health care. In this paper we report on ideas of the FRUX project about an 
electronic marketplace called Social Chart. We want to analyse what are the 
opportunities of the electronic marketplace Social Chart in the business model of 
the Dutch health care system. The analysis is done with the e3-value/control 
methodology, which applies business modelling and accounting  control theory 
approaches to the design of network organisations. Our second goal is to 
investigate the potential use of this methodology for analysis of problems in 
network business models and for discovering of new business models. 
Keywords: value modelling, e3-value/control, inter-organisational control 
mechanisms, electronic marketplace, e-health. 
1 Introduction 
Currently, there is an ongoing restructuring of the health care system in the 
Netherlands. The general idea is to shift from a supply-driven towards a demand-
driven service provisioning (Ex et.al 2003, MinVWZ 2005). While in the supply-
driven system people were able to get a subsidy only for services of a limited 
number of government contracted providers (e.g. big hospitals), in the restructured 
system they will be able to get funding for services from a wider range of service 
providers.  
One of the goals of this restructuring is to make the health care services better 
available to people. This restructuring aims to increase the number of health care 
providers, and creates opportunities for the entrance of new market players, such 
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as intermediaries, who offer bundles of health care services from different service 
providers. Currently many health care providers provide online information about 
their services, and the patient’s choice of these services will be more and more 
influenced by this type of online information. It is expected that the combination 
of demand-driven service provisioning and online information dissemination will 
lead to more electronic marketplaces in the health care industry.  In this paper we 
report on some results of the FRUX project about the so called Social Chart 
(Droes et.al. 2005). The Social Chart is a web-site that is currently developed to 
offer online information about care providers in the Netherlands for a specific 
group of people; namely dementia patients and those people who help these 
patients. The Social Chart has two main functions: an online care product advice, 
and quality assessment via an online community review system. The second 
function was one of the results of the control analysis of the Social Chart 
presented in this paper. It is expected that the Social Chart will play an important 
role in facilitating the development of electronic marketplaces for health care 
services.   
The goal of this paper is twofold. Our first goal is to analyse the control problems 
that arise due to demand-driven service provisioning in the Dutch health care 
system, and which role the Social Chart can play in the solution of these control 
problems. We use the e3-value/control methodology (Kartseva et.al. 2005) for this 
analysis. This methodology applies ideas from accounting control theories to the 
business modelling methodology e3-value (Gordijn, Akkermans 2003). Our 
second goal is to investigate the use of this analysis of control problems in 
business models for discovering new business opportunities related to solutions of 
these control problems.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, in section 2 we explain 
concepts of the e3-value/control methodology. In section 3 we describe and 
analyse the case in the health care sector. In section 4 we present conclusions. 
2 Design of inter-organisational control 
mechanisms  
In our previous work (Kartseva et.al. 2005) we introduced the e3-value/control 
methodology. The e3-value/control methodology consists of the e3-value/control 
design framework and the e3-value/control ontology. Because the e3-value/control 
methodology is an extension of the e3-value methodology (Gordijn, Akkermans 
2003), we first shortly explain the e3-value methodology. 
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2.1 e3-value  
The e3-value methodology supports the conceptualisation of a business network by 
constructing a value model (see Gordijn, Akkermans 2003), representing it 
graphically in a rigorous and structured way, and performing an economic 
sensitivity analysis for all organisations involved. In particular, the e3-value 
methodology provides modelling concepts (the e3-value ontology) for showing 
which parties exchange things of economic value with whom, and expect what in 
return. The methodology has been validated in a series of case studies including 
media, news, banking and insurance, electricity power, and telecommunication 
companies to design value models of network organisation (Gordijn, Akkermans 
2003). 
 
 
Figure 1. An e3-value model of a Purchase with Tax payment. 
A value model in Figure 1 represents a buyer obtains goods from a seller and 
offers money in return. According to the law, the seller is obliged to pay the value-
added tax (VAT). To represent this simple value model, e3-value utilises such 
concepts as Actor, Value object, Value exchange etc. A more detailed description 
of e3-value concepts can be found in the Appendix. 
2.2 The e3-value/control design framework 
Based on the control theory (Romney, Steinbart 2003, Starreveld et.al. 2004), in 
designing control mechanisms it must be considered what could go wrong in the 
value model. The value model can be in two states: (1) actors act in a way the e3-
value model prescribes, which further is referred to as an ideal situation, or (2) 
actors violate some prescriptions of the value model, which is referred to as a sub-
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ideal situation. Therefore, to design control mechanisms, we propose an e3-
value/control design framework, which consists of the following three steps:  
Step 1. Design of the ideal situation within value exchange perspective 
Step 2. Control problem analysis, or the analysis of possible sub-ideal situations  
Step 3. Design of inter-organisational controls, including detecting, preventing and 
correcting control problems 
In the first step, a normative model is designed. It represents what actually the 
exchanges between actors should be. For example, this model can represent 
exchanges which correspond to an applicable legislation. We call this model the 
ideal value model.  
Actors may behave sub-ideally. Intentional sub-ideal behaviour is fraud and 
embezzlement of value; it is also often referred as opportunistic behaviour. 
Unintentional sub-ideal behaviour is errors, made by actors, which result in an 
incorrect execution of value exchanges. In the second step we capture the 
problems that are caused by sub-ideal behaviour of actors. We call these problems 
control problems. A model, which represents sub-ideal situation, is called the 
sub-ideal value model. 
To prevent or detect the sub-ideal behaviour of actors in a network organisation, 
inter-organisational controls (IOCs) are usually implemented. We define IOCs 
as those measures that limit the risk a party runs in a business transaction due to 
the possible existence of sub-ideal behaviour by its trading partners (based on 
Bons et.al. 1998).  
The internal control theory proposes several control principles for prevention and 
detection of fraud and errors made by employees in a hierarchical organisation(see 
Romney, Steinbart 2003, Starreveld et.al. 2004). The controls can be introduced at 
any level: communication level (e.g. ensuring secure communication lines) or 
organisational structure level (Bons et.al. 1998). The most important principles 
related to the organisational structure are the following: 
1. Segregation of duty principle. No employee should be given too much 
responsibility. There are four general categories of duties or 
responsibilities which are examined when segregation of duties are 
discussed: authorization, custody, record keeping and reconcilliation.   In 
an ideal system, different employees would perform each of these four 
major duties.   
2. Control activity principle: Every operational duty (authorisation, 
custody or record keeping) should have the corresponding control duty 
(reconciliation), executed by a separate, socially detached actor.  
If these principles are not followed, the employees are more likely to make errors 
or commit fraud. Unlike the internal control theory, the management control 
Proceedings RSEEM 2005 – Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam 
 120 
theory (Anthony, Govindarjan 2003) is concerned with control problems related to 
a low performance of employees in an organisation. Because the problems they 
address are different, they propose different control principles, such as 
standardisation of processes and data, creation of incentives for employees, etc. 
Although the abovementioned principles were defined for employees in 
hierarhical organisation, they are also valid for an inter-organisational setting. 
Namely, segregation of duties in an inter-organisational setting means the 
segregation of duties between actors in a value model (Bons et.al. 1998). IOCs can 
be designed using the principles described above. In Step 3, we change the ideal 
value model of Step 1 by adding IOCs. The changed model is called the control 
value model. In the control value model the IOCs prevent or detect sub-ideal 
behaviour of actors, modelled in Step 2.
Step 3
Control
Value Model 
Step 2
Sub-ideal 
Value Model
Step 1
Ideal Value Model
 
Figure 2. The e3-value/control 
design framework 
The three steps can be repeated in 
cycles (see Figure 2). The result of the 
third step (the control value model) is 
an ideal model, different from the ideal 
value model of the first step. The 
control value model can also be a 
subject of new control problems. Thus, 
a new cycle of steps can be performed 
taking the control value model as an 
ideal value model in the new cycle. 
Later we demonstrate this cycle 
approach in the case study. 
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2.3  The e3-value/control ontology 
The e3-value methodology defines a constraint called the Principle of Reciprocity. 
It states that an actor can exchange a value object with another actor only in return 
for at least one another value object; otherwise the actor does not exchange at all. 
A sub-ideal behaviour, modelled in Step 2, implies that the principle of reciprocity 
is not fulfilled. For example, in the situation “The buyer delivers goods, the seller 
does not pay”, only one value object “Goods” is actually exchanged. Modelling 
such a situation in e3-value is not correct, because it requires modelling a non-
reciprocal exchange of the value object “Goods”.  
To model exchanges for a sub-ideal behaviour, in Kartseva et.al. (2005) we 
proposed to extend the e3-value ontology. First, in e3-value/control it is allowed to 
model non-reciprocal value exchanges. As a result of sub-ideal behaviour, some 
value exchanges are not reciprocal, or executed differently than in the ideal model 
(e.g. incorrectly, inaccurately, illegally, etc.). We call these exchanges sub-ideal 
value exchanges and represent them with dashed lines. Value objects of the sub-
ideal value exchanges are given a different name than the corresponding value 
objects in the ideal value model (e.g. “No Goods”, “No Payment”, “Damaged 
Goods”). Second, to model a violating actor, a concept of a penalty is introduced. 
A penalty can be assigned to an actor who executed the sub-ideal behaviour. For 
more details about the e3-value/control see Kartseva et.al. (2005). 
3 Case study 
The prime objective for health care in the Netherlands is that it should be 
accessible to all people living in the Netherlands, high quality and affordable. Two 
categories of health insurance guarantee this objective. The first category is 
regular medical health insurance for the costs of regular medical care services 
such as those relating to general practitioners, hospitals and pharmacies. To be 
insured, a person pays a premium to an insurance company. The second category 
is insurance for exceptional care. The Act on Extraordinary Medical Expenses (in 
Dutch: AWBZ1) offers insurance to all Dutch citizens in case of protracted illness, 
invalidity, learning disability, mental disorders and geriatric diseases. The 
exceptional health care costs are reimbursed from an AWBZ fund, collected from 
taxes.  
                                                          
1
 In Dutch: Algemene Wet Bijzondere Ziektekosten (AWBZ) 
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In this case study we only analyse changes in the business model of exceptional 
health care in the Netherlands. According to the e3-value/control design 
framework, the analysis is unfolded in cycles.  
The data were collected from a number of semi-structured interviews with experts 
from different organisations health care. In total, about five experts were 
interviewed. In addition, the data were collected from publicly available 
documents (Ex et.al 2003, Extre et.al. 2004, Okma 2001, PGB 2005, Klaver, 
Scholten 2002) and government web-sites (www.zorgaanzet.nl, www.minvws.nl, 
www.pgb.nl, ww.cvz.nl, www.overheid.nl). The models were verified by experts.  
We start with the past scenario to demonstrate how the Dutch health care system 
changed from a supply-driven to a demand-driven system. In the future scenario 
we demonstrate where opportunities for new business models of electronic 
marketplace are created. 
3.1 Cycle 1: The Exceptional Care System 
In the first cycle in Step 1 we model the scenario of the exceptional care in the 
past. In Step 2 we analyse control problems in this scenario and in Step 3 we 
model control mechanisms. 
3.1.1 Step 1: The Past Scenario in Health Care 
In order to obtain the AWBZ funding a patient must receive an assessment from 
an organisation called Regional Needs Assessment Body2 (RIOs). The RIO 
investigates, based on a diagnosis from a specialist or general practitioner, if the 
patient qualifies for the AWBZ funding, and, if so, sends the patient a needs 
assessment letter. Until 2003 the needs assessment letter had two functions. First, 
it advised the patient what services he needs, and second, it gave the patient a 
legal right to get funding for these services from the AWBZ fund. After the needs 
assessment letter is received, the patient applies to a Care Administration Office 
(CAO), whose role is to connect the patient with a care provider. The payment to 
care providers is also done by the CAO. As well as the RIO, the CAO receives 
money from the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport (from the AWBZ fund). In 
addition, the patient also pays the care provider a personal contribution, whose 
amount is regulated by law.  
Figure 3 represents an e3-value model of the described scenario. The scenario 
starts with the patient, who needs exceptional care. The patient receives “Product” 
from care providers. The patient gives the RIO a proof of sickness (“Diagnosis 
proof”). In return, the RIO gives the needs assessment letter, modelled with two 
value exchanges: “Product match” and “Right for Product”. The exchanges of the 
                                                          
2
 In Ducth: regionaal indicatieorgaan (RIO) 
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patient with the RIO and the care provider are connected with the AND-fork, 
which means that the patient cannot get “Product” without the needs assessment 
letter (“Product match” and “Right for Product”). The patients exchange the 
“Right for Product” with the CAO via the same interface as they exchange 
“Product” with the care providers. This models that the patient can get “Product” 
from the care provider only if the CAO confirms the needs assessment letter.  
In the exchange between patient and the ministry we model that the responsibility 
for the quality of health care lies with the government. The patients pay taxes, 
which are then used for the AWBZ funding. In return, the ministry has to deliver 
quality healthcare.  
The AWBZ fund is distributed in the following way. The RIO gets a fraction of 
AWBZ funding in return for the “Needs assessment”, a service, described above, 
executed by the RIO on behalf of the ministry. Another fraction of the AWBZ 
fund is transferred to the CAO, in exchange for “Matching patient and care 
provider”. 
The CAO pays to the care providers. Until 2003, the system was supply-driven. 
The care providers were paid not based on the products they deliver, but based on 
the products they offer. The exchange of “Budget” and “Available products” 
between care providers and the CAO lies on the dependency path that starts with a 
new start stimulus at the care provider. There is no dependency path between the 
payment to the care provider (“Budget”) and services the care provider actually 
delivers (“Product”). In addition, the care provider is also paid by the patient 
(“Personal Contribution”).  
 
Proceedings RSEEM 2005 
 124 
 
Figure 3. Supply-driven care. Control problems: inadequate needs 
assessment and no quality control of care providers 
3.1.2 Step 2: Problems in the Exceptional Care System 
The scenario of Step 1 contains several control problems. In this step we model 
them using e3-value/control. The control problems are modelled in Figure 3 with 
dashed sub-ideal value exchanges. 
Control problem 1: Inadequate needs assessment by the RIO 
Description: The first problem concerns the RIO. The RIO is responsible for 
matching products and the patient’s needs (“Product match”), and for giving the 
patient the right to be paid for these products (“Right for product”). The problem 
was that the RIO tended to give the needs assessment letter not based on real 
needs of the patient, but based on the available products. The needs assessment 
faze was performed not sufficiently good by the RIO. In addition, it was also 
possible that the RIO could assign to a patient more available products or products 
of a favoured care providers. As came out of interviews with experts, this situation 
led to multiple cases of inadequate needs assessment: patients from different 
regions were given different products for the same diagnosis. From the control 
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theory perspective, the problem occurred because of inadequate segregation of 
duties. The RIO was given too much responsibility by doing both needs 
assessment and giving the rights for products. 
Modelling: This problem is modelled in Figure 3 by marking the value exchanges 
“Product match”, “Right for product” and “Needs assessment” with dashed lines. 
A penalty P1 is assigned to the RIO to mark this actor as the responsible for the 
sub-ideal exchanges.  
Control problem 2: Low quality of products by care providers 
Description: The quality of health care is of major importance. In Figure 3, we do 
not have an actor who would ensure the quality of care products. This violates the 
control activity principle (see section 2). There is no actor, who controls quality of 
products. As a result, provisioning of products of lower quality could remain 
undetected. 
Modelling:  In the model in Figure 3 the exchange of “Product” between the 
patients and care providers is marked as sub-ideal, and a penalty P2 is assigned to 
the care provider.  
The control problems 1 and 2 could result in a low quality of healthcare, and in 
inadequate taxes. Therefore, the exchanges “Taxes” and “Quality of health care” 
between the patients and the ministry are also marked with a dashed line.  
3.1.3 Step 3: The Exceptional Care System untill Recently 
In Figure 4 we model how the exceptional care system was modified by the Dutch 
government on April 1, 2003, and how it affected the control problems.  
Control mechanism 1: Splitting the “Product Match” and “Needs Assessment” 
Value Exchanges. 
Description: To solve the first problem, the government separated the functions of 
the RIO. Instead of the RIO, a Care Indication Determination Centre (CIZ) was 
created. The needs assessment executed by the CIZ has to be independent, the 
mission statement of the CIZ3 states. Unlike the RIO, the CIZ is only responsible 
for needs assessment, but is not legally responsible for assigning a patient with a 
specific product.  
                                                          
3
 “Het is onze missie om op grond van wettelijke bepalingen de indicatiestellingen voor de 
Algemene Wet Bijzondere Ziektekosten eenduidig, onafhankelijk en integraal uit te 
voeren voor onze cliënten.” From web-site of CIZ (www.ciz.nl) 
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Figure 4. Demand-driven care. Controls: splitting value exchanges of the RIO, 
introduction of functions and the CVZ 
 
In addition, the government created a function-based needs assessment. Seven 
types of care products and services (called functions) were defined. Each function 
has a different price, depending on the degree of seriousness of the patient’s 
disease. The CIZ provides a needs assessment letter, which indicates functions the 
patient has a right for. Based on the needs assessment, the CAO is responsible for 
providing the patient a care provider who can implement the functions in the 
needs assessment letter. The introduction of the functions is a control mechanism, 
called standardisation. It implements similar ideas as standard costing from 
management control (Anthony, Govindarjan 2003). Having this standardisation 
allows providing a needs assessment, based on common standards (functions), and 
not related to available products. This makes the needs assessment objective. 
Modelling: In Figure 4 the “Function match” is provided to the patients by the 
CAO (unlike “Product match” by the RIO in Figure 3). The CIZ does not provide 
the “Right for products” to the patients, as in Figure 3, but the “Right for 
functions”.  
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Control mechanism 2: Assessment of Care Providers 
Description: To solve the second control problem, the government introduced a 
requirement that the CAO can only make a contract with a care provider, if the 
care provider has an accreditation from the Health Care Insurance Board (CVZ). 
A care provider has to proof to the CVZ that he has enough means and expertise to 
deliver AWBZ-related products.  
In addition, the care provider is now paid depending on the products he provides. 
The system is demand-driven.  
Modelling: As in Figure 3, the CAO pays to the care provider (“Budget”). The 
system in Figure 4 is demand-driven. The value exchanges “Budget” and “AWBZ 
product” are at the same value interface, which states that the care provider 
receives “Budget” depending on what products were delivered to the patients. This 
is different from Figure 3, where these two value exchanges were not connected 
by the same dependency path. Following the dependency path at the care provider, 
we have exchanges with the CVZ. The care provider delivers to the CVZ “Ability 
to deliver functions” and receives in return “Accreditation for AWBZ functions”. 
“Budget” and “Accreditation for AWBZ functions” are connected via the 
dependency path, which states that only having this accreditation a care provider 
can receive “Budget” from the CAO.  
3.2 Second Cycle: Personal Budget and Social Chart 
In this section, according to the e3-value/control framework, we start the new 
cycle. We take the model in Figure 4 as an input of the Step 1 of the second cycle. 
In the second cycle in Step 1 we model how the exceptional care system has 
changed due to new regulations introduced by the government. In Step 2 we 
demonstrate that the control mechanisms of the first cycle do not work anymore, 
causing new unsolved control problems. In Step 3 we offer new business model of 
an electronic marketplace in the exceptional care. This new business model also 
plays a role of IOCs.  
3.2.1 Step 1: Introduction of Personal Budget 
Due to the lack of facilities of the CAO-contracted care providers, and an 
increasing demand for exceptional care, this system became very expensive an 
inefficient, and queues of people waiting for an available care provider grew 
enormously. To solve this problem, the government created a possibility to receive 
AWBZ funding not in kind, as in the previous scenario, but in cash. The patient, 
entitled to the AWBZ funding, can get a sum of money (called Personal Budget) 
from the CAO and find a care provider himself. A care provider may be a family 
member or a private carer. As a result, for the same needs assessment with the 
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personal budget, a patient can find more man-hours of services from private carers 
than he would get via the CAO.  
In Figure 5 the scenario with Personal Budget is modelled. Compared to Figure 4, 
one of the fundamental changes in the new health care system is that a patient gets 
a Personal Budget from the CAO and finds a care provider himself. A care 
provider does not operate via the CAO, and does not need the accreditation from 
the CVZ. Therefore, we distinguish two types of care providers: (regular) care 
providers and alternative care providers.  
 
 
Figure 5. Control problems with the Personal Budget system 
3.2.2 Step 2: Problems Caused by the Introduction of Personal Budget 
We found two control problems in the scenario in Figure 5.  
Control problem 3: Patients have insufficient information about alternative care 
providers  
Description: The first problem is that the patients and their family members are 
not well-informed about available alternative care providers. As it became clear 
from the interviews with experts, due to this knowledge asymmetry, the patients 
tend to select well-known service providers, offered by the CAO, rather than 
alternative providers. This may result in low usage of alternative providers’ 
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services, and in an insufficient development of the alternative care providers 
market.  
Modelling: In Figure 5 this problem is expressed by making the value exchange 
“Product match” between the CAO and the patients a sub-ideal value exchange. 
This results in the sub-ideal exchange “Matching patient and care provider” 
between the CAO and the ministry. The CAO is assigned a penalty P3.  
We should mention that this problem is not a typical control problem caused by 
fraud or an error by one of the actors. This problem belongs to a kind of 
management control problems, related to low organisational performance (see 
section 2). In our case we have low inter-organisational performance. We are able 
to model this performance-related problem with the e3-value/control methodology.  
Control problem 4: Risk of low quality of alternative care providers 
Description: The second problem is related to the risk of low quality of products 
delivered by alternative care providers. In case of traditional care providers, the 
quality control is performed directly by the CVZ. In case of alternative care 
providers, such a direct quality control is very expensive. The market of 
alternative care providers is expected to expand enormously in upcoming years; 
there will be thousands of new alternative care providers. For example, even the 
care of a patient provided by a relative can be considered as an alternative care 
provider. Hence, it will be undoable for the CVZ to perform a quality control for 
all these new alternative providers.  
Modelling: This problem is modelled by marking the exchange of AWBZ product 
between the patient and the alternative care provider dashed. A penalty P4 is 
assigned to the alternative care provider. 
3.2.3 Step 3: A Future Scenario: the Social Chart 
To solve the control problems 3 and 4, in Figure 6, which depicts the future 
scenario, we introduced a new actor, called Social Chart. The Social Chart is an 
information web-site for patients and their carers. The concept of the Social Chart 
was proposeed in the FRUX project (Droes et.al. 2005). Following our 
framework, we explain how the Social Chart can solve the control problems 3 and 
4.  
Control mechanism 3 – Social Chart provides Specific Product Advice 
Description: The control problem 3 is related to the lack of information about 
alternative care providers. To solve this problem, the Social Chart provides a 
specific product advice. This specific product advice is online information about 
alternative care providers. The Social Chart in the FRUX project is targeted at 
providers for a specific group of illness, for example, providers for patients with 
dementia.  
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Modelling: In Figure 6 the Social Chart is introduced as a new actor. The Social 
Chart delivers to the patients a service “Alternative care provider advice”. As a 
result, the value exchange “Matching patient and care provider” is exchanged with 
the CAOs and the exchange “Matching patient and care provider” between the 
CAO and the ministry is not sub-ideal, as in Figure 5. The penalty P3 is still 
assigned to the CAO, because the CAO did not change its behaviour. The value 
exchange “Function match” is still sub-ideal. The other sub-ideal value exchanges 
were corrected due to the introduction of the new exchange “Alternative care 
provider advice” with the Social Chart. 
 
Figure 6. Role of Social Chart: control of quality and alternative 
care provider match 
Control mechanism 4  – Social Chart provides Informal Quality Control 
Description: The problem 4 is related to the absence of quality control of 
alternative care providers. To tackle this problem, we propose that the Social 
Chart provides informal quality control facilities. For example, by enabling a peer 
review by an online community as described in Dannecker, Lechner (2004). In 
this way the Social Chart web-site can provide an informal quality assessment 
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instrument. This can be a forum or a rating mechanism, were the users can share 
their experiences about different alternative care providers, comparable to the 
book  review system in the online bookshop Amazon.com. In this manner the 
knowledge about the quality of products can be shared. As a result, people will 
prefer services that are recommended by others to have a better quality. 
Modelling: The quality assessment facility is a service provided by the Social 
chart to the patients. In Figure 6 the Social Chart gets in return from the patients 
the “Assessment of care providers”. The value exchange “Informal assessment of 
care providers” is introduced between the Social Chart and the CVZ.  
Because these problems are important for the government, we suppose that they 
are the potential funding source for the Social Chart. In Figure 6 we modelled the 
Social Chart funded by both the CVZ and CAO.  Because the CVZ is responsible 
for monitoring the quality of care providers, they might be interested in funding 
the Social Chart. Another source of funding is by the CAO; in return for a better 
patient and provider matching. This model is only one of the many options.  
4 Conclusions 
One of the goals of this case study was to investigate the potential use of the e3-
value/control methodology for the analysis of control problems in network 
business models and for discovering new business opportunities related to the 
solutions of these control problems. By applying the three-step approach we 
analysed in a structured way the changes in the health care system at various 
stages, and represented it from the value perspective. We also modelled the Social 
Chart. Initially, it was unclear what the commercial value of the Social Chart in 
the new health care system is, and why the government should pay for it. During 
this modelling process we explicitly modelled the value of the Social Chart for the 
government. Furthermore, we proposed an additional online community 
functionality of the Social Chart for informal quality assessment of alternative 
care providers, which was not considered in its initial version (Droes et.al. 2005). 
In particular, this informal quality assessment is expected to contribute 
significantly to the value of the Social Chart. As a result we also achieved the 
other goal of the paper and were able to analyse opportunities of the Social Chart.  
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Appendix 
Description of e3value concepts.  
Actor. An actor is perceived by its environment as an independent economic (and 
often legal) entity.  An actor makes a profit or increases its utility. In a sound, 
sustainable, business model each actor should be capable of making profit.  
Value Object. Actors exchange value objects, which are services, products, 
money, or even consumer experiences.  The important point here is that a value 
object is of value for one or more actors.   
Value Port. An actor uses a value port to show to its environment that it wants to 
provide or request value objects.  The concept of port enables to abstract away 
from the internal business processes, and to focus only on how external actors and 
other components of the business model can be ‘plugged in’.  
Value Interface. Actors have one or more value interfaces, grouping reciprocal, 
opposite-directed value ports.  A value interface shows the value object an actor is 
willing to exchange, in return for another value object via its ports. The exchange 
of value objects is atomic at the level of the value interface. 
Value Exchange. A value exchange is used to connect two value ports with each 
other. It represents one or more potential trades of value objects between value 
ports.   
With the concepts introduced so far, we can explain who wants to exchange values 
with whom, but we cannot yet explain what happens in response to a particular 
end-consumer need. For this purpose we include in the value model a 
representation of dependency paths (based on [Buhr]) between value interfaces. A 
dependency path connects the value interfaces in an actor and represents 
triggering relations between these interfaces. A dependency path consists of 
dependency nodes and segments. 
Dependency node. A dependency node is a stimulus (represented by a bullet), a 
value interface, an AND-fork or AND-join (short line), an OR-fork or OR-join 
(triangle), or an end node (bull's eye). A stimulus represents a consumer need; an 
end node represents final state in a model. 
Dependency segment. A dependency segment connects dependency nodes and 
value interfaces. It is represented by a link.  
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Dependency path. A dependency path is a set of dependency nodes and segments 
that leads from a start stimulus (also called a consumer need) to an end stimulus. 
A path indicates that if values are exchanged via a value interface, then other 
value interfaces, connected by the path, also exchange values. 
 
